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The People’s Republic of China is, according to its Constitution, “a unitary multi-national 
state” based on the socialist system. The Constitution also allows the state to establish 
“special administrative regions” in light of “specific conditions.” This provision backs 
the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” that China applies to achieve territorial 
reunification, through allowing the relevant territories to continue with their capitalist 
system and way of life. This principle was operationalised in the cases of Hong Kong and 
Macau, resulting in the establishment of two Special Administrative Regions, each of 
which governed by a “Basic Law” prescribing the systems of the relevant region, when 
China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over them on 1 July 1997 and 20 December 
1999 respectively. This article considers the two decades of constitutional and legal 
interactions between the Chinese “Central Authorities” and these sub-national Special 
Administrative Regions, so as to highlight the socialist mechanisms of central control 
that have been applied constitutionally, politically, economically and socially in Hong 
Kong and Macau to ensure that “One Country, Two Systems” with not be “distorted,” 
that national sovereignty, security and development interests are safeguarded, and that 
these regions will play a positive role in national economic development. It is clear from 
this study that the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in the two regions 
has been “developmental,” with the law serving the interests of the “Centre” under the 
leadership of the Communist Party of China.
Keywords: People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong; socialist state; unitary state; Special 
Administrative Region; “One Country, Two Systems”; central-local relations; mechanisms 
of central control.
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Introduction
China has advanced the principle of “one Country, two Systems” (oCtS principle) 
for the peaceful reunification of territories with the motherland since the 1980s. in 
1997 and 1999, the oCtS principle was put into practice by the establishment of the 
Special administrative regions (Sars) of Hong Kong and macau following the return 
of those territories from British and Portuguese administration respectively.
unlike the socialist approach dealing with the question of “nationalities” hitherto, 
the oCtS principle is innovative as a political, institutional and constitutional initiative, 
whereby a socialist state led by the communist party vanguard, allows a territory 
to be administered by its local inhabitants with a “high degree of autonomy” and 
remaining in the meantime “capitalist” both in the economy and the way of life. 
and, to ensure peaceful transition of the resumption of exercise of sovereignty and 
assure the local inhabitants, the policies following the oCtS principle were set out 
in declaratory writing, together with a commitment that they would be stipulated 
in a “Basic Law” and remain unchanged for 50 years.1
1  See the Joint declaration of the Government of united Kingdom of Great Britain and the Government 
of the People’s republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (19 december 1984), 1399 u.n.t.S. 
33; 23 i.L.m. 1366 (1984); and the Joint declaration of the Government of the republic of Portugal and 
the Government of the People’s republic of China on the Question of macao (26 march 1987), 1498 
u.n.t.S. 195; 5 asian ybk. of intl. L. 567 (1995).
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the commencement of the Basic Laws in respect of the Hong Kong Special admi-
nistrative region (HKSar) in 1997 and in respect of the macau Special administrative 
region (mSar) in 1999 respectively began two decades of constitutional and 
legal interactions,2 if not struggle, between “the Central authorities” and the Sars 
principally through the medium of the sub-national Basic Laws, and at some critical 
junctures by the intervening reliance of the national Constitution.3
this article seeks to highlight the socialist thinking and mechanisms of central 
control that have been applied constitutionally, politically, economically and socially 
in Hong Kong and macau to ensure –
• that the “One Country, Two Systems” policy would not be “distorted”;
• that the “intentions” underlying the Basic Law would be observed;
• that national sovereignty, national security and national development interests 
would be safeguarded; and
• that the Special Administrative Regions would play a positive role in national 
economic development.
the Centre-initiated mechanisms have thus far included –
• the enlivening and timely application of the power of interpretation of the Basic 
Law by the Standing Committee of the national People’s Congress (nPCSC) (the standing 
body of the highest organ of state power, the national People’s Congress (nPC));
• the establishment of a liaison office of the Central People’s Government (CPG) in 
the Sar of cadres deployed there to monitor, liaise and co-ordinate political, social 
and cultural factions and units in the Sar through united Front and other works;
• the support and promotion of a form of “Chief Executive-led” government in 
the Sar to the exclusion of the practice of other governmental approaches such as 
a parliamentary system or a separation of powers/check and balance system;
• the inclusion of the SARs into the five-year programmatic national economic 
planning system, and the social and way of life integration of the Sars with their 
neighbouring cities (like the “Greater Bay area” concept and outline development 
plan) and of the residents of the Sars with their Chinese mainland compatriots (like 
the introduction of a resident card for those residents living in the Chinese mainland 
to enable them to enjoy state benefits); and
• the enactment, for the HKSAR, of a national law to safeguard national security 
there.
2  the Basic Law of the HKSar and the Basic Law of the mSar are structurally identical but have differences 
in drafting, including in relation to provisions protective of rights and freedoms of residents. For 
a comparison of the two Basic Laws, see albert H.y. Chen & Pui yin Lo, The Constitutional Orders of “One 
Country, Two Systems”: A Comparative Study of the Visible and Invisible Bases of Constitutional Review and 
Proportionality Analysis in the Chinese Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau in The 
Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective 230 (rosalind dixon & adrienne Stone eds., 2018).
3  For comparisons of the legal systems of the HKSar and the mSar in the english language, see ignazio 
Castellucci, Legal Hybridity in Hong Kong and Macau, 57(4) mcGill L.J. 665 (2011); and eric C. ip, Hybrid 
Constitutionalism: The Politics of Constitutional Review in the Chinese Special Administrative Regions (2019).
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reactions in the two Sars to interventions of the Central authorities have differed. 
Legal elites and pro-democracy politicians in the HKSar have reacted strongly against 
the Centre’s interventions and sought to enlist the courts of the HKSar to produce 
jurisprudence protective of the “two systems” element of the “one Country, two 
Systems” principle and resisted the introduction, maintenance and propagation of 
socialist approaches that are seen as “corrosive” of Hong Kong’s common law-based 
and internationalist legal and judicial systems.4 the response of the ruling elite in the 
mSar, by contrast, has been patriotically supportive.5 Hence this article will primary 
look into the moves and exchanges between the Central authorities, the HKSar’s 
Chief executive and the Government he or she leads, and the HKSar’s civil society in 
relation to central control to illustrate the extent that the socialist legacy in matters 
of legality have continued in China in the four decades since the adoption by the 
Communist Party of China of the policy of “reform and opening up.”
1. The People’s Republic of China as a Socialist Unitary State
the People’s republic of China (PrC) was founded in 1949 as a “people’s democ-
ratic state” that implements “people’s democratic dictatorship” under the leadership 
of the working class, opposing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, 
in struggle for the independence, democracy, peace, unification, strength and 
prosperity of China.6
at the time of foundation, the PrC had not reunited all Chinese territories. the 
island of Hainan was liberated in may 1950. the “Seventeen Points agreement,” which 
paved the way for the peaceful liberation of tibet, was signed and sealed in may 1951. 
By the time the first Constitution of the People’s republic of China (PrC Constitution) 
4  See, generally, Pui yin Lo, An Internationalist, Consequentialist and Non-progressive Court: Constitutional 
Adjudication in Hong Kong (1997–2009), 2 City u. H.K. L. rev. 215 (2010).
5  the mSar has fulfilled in 2009 its “obligation” to enact locally legislation safeguarding national security; 
see Section 3.5 below. the Government of the mSar has also maintained a conservative policy of not 
admitting into macau politically active or controversial Hong Kong residents as well as journalists 
based in Hong Kong or of particular news organizations, on the ground that their presence there may 
jeopardise the public security of this Sar; see Johannes m.m. Chan, Paths of Justice 212–217 (2018); and 
Hong Kong Journalists denied entry to macau, Committee to Protect Journalists, 28 august 2017 (mar. 5, 
2021), available at https://cpj.org/2017/08/hong-kong-journalists-denied-entry-to-macau/. moves have 
been made to orient the systems of the mSar from Portuguese influence, including the dismissal of two 
Portuguese legal advisers to the mSar’s legislature in 2018 and the enactment of legislation also in 2018 
to ensure that only judges who are Chinese nationals may hear and determine cases with a national 
security dimension; see Farah master, In Macau, Portuguese Elites Feel Squeezed Out by Chinese Influence, 
reuters, 5 october 2018 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-macau-china-
law/in-macau-portuguese-elites-feel-squeezed-out-by-chinese-influence-iduSKCn1mF0oQ.
6  Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, adopted by the First 
Plenary Session of the CPPCC on 29 September 1949, art. 1. the Common Programme can be regarded 
as a provisional constitutional instrument of the PrC. an english translation is available at http://www.
lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=13212&lib=law.
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was adopted on 20 September 1954 by the First Session of the First nPC,7 the territory 
of inner mongolia was already a regional ethnic autonomous region,8 with Xinjiang 
and tibet gradually following suit in the next decade.9 yet, at the time, the Government 
of the republic of China of the Kuomintang that the Chinese People’s Liberation 
army of the CPC defeated in the Civil War of 1945–1949 had relocated to the island of 
taiwan and its associated territories of Penghu, Kinmen and matsu. and Hong Kong 
and macau remained under the colonial rule of Britain and Portugal respectively. 
nevertheless, in the course of the founding of the People’s republic and the drafting 
of its constitutional documents, the question of whether the new State should adopt 
a form of a federalist structure similar to that the Soviet union of constituent republics 
was debated. Having referred to the writings of marx, engels, Lenin and Stalin and 
considering the formation of the Soviet union as a case of the fragmentation of 
russian state after multiple revolutions, the decision was made to adopt the system 
of a unitary state under which regional autonomy would be implemented in areas 
with a particular national minority population.10
reunification of the motherland was firmly in the agenda of the CPC in the drafting 
of the current PrC Constitution in the early 1980s. ye Jianying, the Chairman of the 
nPCSC, made a public statement in 1981 calling for a repeat in the co-operations 
between the CPC and the Kuomingtang, commencement of exchanges between the 
Chinese mainland and the taiwan region, and reunification on terms that the taiwan 
region would have a degree of autonomy as a “Special administrative region,” retain 
7  Constitution of the People’s republic of China (1954), which, in its Preamble, stated that it was based 
on the Common Programme, and in article 3, stated that the PrC “is a single multi-national state,” with 
“regional autonomy” being applicable to areas of “compact communities” of “national minorities.” an 
english translation is available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=52993&lib=law.
8  the CPC’s approach to regional ethnic autonomy approximated with that practised by Stalin in the Soviet 
union than the resolution to the problem of “nationalities” advocated by Lenin in his “Last testament: 
Letters to the Congress – the Question of nationalities or autonomisation”; see Beryl Williams, Lenin and 
the Problem of Nationalities, 15(4-6) Hist. eur. ideas 611 (1992); and Joseph Lian, How Lenin Considered 
the Problem of “Nationalities” Back Then, Hong Kong econ. J., 16 July 2009 (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), 
available at http://hktext.blogspot.com/2009/07/blog-post_8235.html. Shiyuan Hao considered that 
the Soviet union made “premature judgments about the development course for socialist construction” 
and handled the problem of nationalities “in a radical and simplistic manner,” and then promoted 
CPC’s leadership work under the praxis of “human development” by way of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” through implementing regional national autonomy in areas with concentrations of 
minority nationalities, quoting mao Zedong’s words for continuing “to study Stalin diligently wherever 
he is right,” while making sure that the study “is linked with the Chinese reality”; see Shiyuan Hao, How 
the Communist Party of China Manages the Issue of Nationality: An Evolving Topic 1 (2016).
9  See in the case of Xinjiang, State Council information office, Cultural Protection and development 
in Xinjiang (november 2018) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_
paper/2018/11/15/content_281476391524846.htm. See, in the case of tibet, State Council information 
office, democratic reform in tibet – Sixty years on (march 2019) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://
english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/28/content_281476583712704.htm.
10  Jie Cheng, The Way of Governance and the Power of Governance: A Systemic Analysis of China’s Cons-
titution 164–166 (2015) (in Chinese).
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its own military, maintain unchanged its existing social, economic systems, way of 
life, and economic and cultural relations with foreign countries, and that there be 
no interference with private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of 
inheritance and foreign investment there.11 on 24 September 1982, deng Xiaoping 
told margaret thatcher, the visiting British Prime minister, that China would recover 
the whole of Hong Kong from Britain in 1997 and apply policies on Hong Kong that 
would keep in force the then “political and economic systems and even most of its 
laws.”12 the oCtS principle was then being shaped by the leaders of the CPC, who 
intended to apply it to reunite taiwan and Hong Kong.13
the current Constitution of the People’s republic of China, adopted by the nPC 
on 4 december 1982,14 thus charted in the Preamble the transition of the Chinese 
people of all nationalities in transforming China into a socialist society under the 
leadership of the CPC and declared the PrC as “a unitary multi-national state created 
jointly by the people of all its nationalities.”15 acknowledging that the “motherland” 
has yet to be reunified,16 the Constitution provides that while fundamentally, the 
socialist system is the basic system of the PrC and shall not be disrupted,17 the state 
“may establish special administrative regions when necessary. the systems to be 
instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by 
the national People’s Congress in the light of specific conditions.”18
11  the full text of Chairman ye see in ye Jianying on taiwan’s return to motherland and Peaceful reuni-
fication (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/7945.htm. See also State Council 
information office and State Council taiwan affairs office, the taiwan Question and reunification 
of China (august 1993) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.
htm; and State Council information office, the one-China Principle and the taiwan issue (February 
2000) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=dbref&id=21&enc
odingname=big5.
12  See Deng Xiaoping on the Question of Hong Kong 3 (1993).
13  yash Ghai summarized this promise of autonomy in yash Ghai, Litigating the Basic Law: Jurisdiction, 
Interpretation and Procedure in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation 3, 29–31 
(Johannes m.m. Chan et al. eds., 2000). the motivations are more than political, since Hong Kong had 
been China’s largest source of foreign direct investment since the beginning of the policy of “reform 
and opening up”; see Kui yin Cheung & Chengze Simon Fan, Hong Kong Investment in China and Income 
Distribution of Hong Kong, 16(4) J. econ. integr. 526 (2001); and michael J. enright, Developing China: 
The Remarkable Impact of Foreign Direct Investment (2017).
14  the PrC Constitution was amended by the nPC in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004 and 2018.
15  PrC Constitution, Preamble.
16  the Preamble of the PrC Constitution refers to “the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including 
our compatriots in taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”
17  PrC Constitution, art. 1. the thirty-sixth amendment to the PrC Constitution, adopted by the nPC 
on 11 march 2018, added to article 1 the provision that the leadership of the CPC is the most basic 
characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
18  PrC Constitution, art. 31.
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albert H.y. Chen discussed the PrC Constitution in terms of its nature, and the form 
of the state and the political system it establishes. as to nature, the PrC Constitution is 
the “mother-law” from which other laws derived and has the status as the “fundamental 
law of the state” and has “supreme legal authority.”19 the form of state, on which the 
form of the political system depends, is considered to be the “people’s democratic 
dictatorship” under the leadership of the CPC.20 the form of the political system for the 
exercise of state power is the people’s congress system, with the nPC being the organ 
through which the people exercise state power at the national level; it is the “supreme 
organ of state power,” the apex of a pyramidal structure of people’s congresses. each of 
the people’s congresses in the hierarchy exercises the power of the people in socialist 
unification of deliberation and execution; it is the people’s congress that deliberates and 
makes the decision and one of the organs directly under it that carries out the decision, 
reports on the carrying out of the decision, and accepts supervision on the same.21
the provisions of the PrC Constitution on the relationship of the nPC to the 
bodies of government at the national level, and the provisions of the Constitution 
on the relationship of the local people’s congresses to the bodies of government 
of the local level implicate the practice of the principle of “democratic centralism,” 
a Leninist principle of state and party organization that has all along been broadly 
applied to the CPC’s governance at state and local levels.22 mao Zedong had 
expressed figuratively his understanding that “democratic centralism” involves four 
“subordinations”: the individual be subordinated to the organization; the minority 
be subordinated to the majority; the lower-level organ be subordinated to the high 
level organ; and the local authority be subordinated to the higher level organ. as 
Jie Cheng has underscored, centralization of power is the object of “democratic 
centralism,” the starting point for resolving central-local relationships and higher-
lower tier relationships. this principle, as Zhou enlai explained, required all works to 
be carried out under unified policy and unified plan, while giving some authority to 
the local agent to take account of local circumstances and further the motivations 
of local cadres.23 even the subsequent discussion by deng Xiaoping in the “reform 
and opening up” era had not played down the element of centralization:
19  PrC Constitution, Preamble and art. 5.
20  PrC Constitution, art. 1. CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping has recently reaffirmed the leadership of the CPC 
in the governance of the PrC according to law, and in the construction of China into a “socialist country 
ruled by law” pursuant to article 5 of the PrC Constitution; see Jinping Xi, Strengthening the Leadership 
of the Party on Comprehensive Law-based Governance of the Country, 4 Qiu Shi (2019) (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 
2021), available at http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-02/15/c_1124114454.htm.
21  albert H.y. Chen, An Introduction to the Chinese Legal System 57–60 (5th ed., Lexisnexis, 2019). See 
also Pitman Potter, China’s Legal System 7–48 (2013); and Qianfan Zhang, The Constitution of China: 
A Contextual Analysis 75–148 (2012).
22  William Partlett & eric C. ip, Is Socialist Law Really Dead?, 48(2) n.y.u. J. int’l L. & Politics 463, 471 (2016).
23  Cheng 2015, at 162–164. See also Sarah Biddulph, Democratic Centralism and Administration in China 
in Socialist Law in Socialist East Asia 195 (Hualing Fu et al. eds., 2018).
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[under] the system, personal interests must be subordinated to collective 
ones, the interests of the part to those of the whole, and immediate to long-
term interests.24
the basics of the governance of China under the leadership of the CPC have 
been sketched: the PrC is a unitary state of the people exercising power through 
organs of power under the leadership of the CPC in a centralized manner. this article 
shall seek to illustrate in the succeeding sections that the features of the PrC state 
summarized here are very much present in the interactions between the Central 
authorities and the Sars, notwithstanding that there is a law enacted by the nPC 
that has established the systems of the Sars for the exercise of autonomy by the 
local inhabitants of each of them.
2. The “One Country, Two Systems” Policy  
and its Implementation
Constitutional provisions give constitutional and legal backing for the state 
policy of “one Country, two Systems,” where the Chinese state, when it achieves 
reunification with taiwan, Hong Kong and macau, would allow these territories to 
continue under the “capitalist” system with the current social and economic systems 
remaining unchanged, their legal systems remaining “basically” unchanged, and 
their ways of life and various statuses remaining unchanged, and to continue to 
maintain or establish economic relations with other countries and regions. Specific 
terms of this policy, as they were to apply to Hong Kong and macau upon the 
resumption of exercise of sovereignty by the PrC over each of them for a stated 
period of 50 years, were set out in the Sino-British Joint declaration on the Question 
of Hong Kong 198425 and the Sino-Portuguese Joint declaration of macau 1987 
respectively.26 these specific terms were stated to be enacted into law in the two 
Joint declarations.
Cross-referencing the specific terms of the PrC’s policies towards Hong Kong and 
macau enacted into law with the PrC’s constitutional provisions and legislation (which 
was enacted in 1984), for regulation of regional autonomy of minority nationalities, 
as yash Ghai, Jason Buhi and Joseph Lian had done, illustrate the distinction of the 
Sars set up under the former from the national autonomous regions regulated under 
the latter. Particularly, the national autonomous regions and their institutions are 
governed by the PrC’s political system of the people’s congresses, and the systems 
24  Xiaoping deng, Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future 
in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982) 151 (1978).
25  Sino-British Joint declaration, supra note 1, arts. 1, 3; annex i.
26  Sino-Portuguese Joint declaration, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2; annex i.
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of supervision for the people’s courts, people’s procuratorates and the supervision 
commissions, pursuant to the principle of democratic centralism.27
the Basic Law of the HKSar was drafted between 1985 and 1990. one question, 
which emerged in the course of the drafting process, required eventually a specific 
decision of the nPC to resolve. this was over the compatibility of the Basic Law 
with the PrC Constitution, bearing in mind that the systems to be established 
pursuant to the Basic Law would be different from, if not diametrically opposed to, 
the socialist basic system of the country, including a political system that promised, 
as the ultimate goal, universal suffrage of the Chief executive (the head of the Sar) 
and all members of the Legislative Council, a legal system based on the common 
law (where national laws made by the nPC or its Standing Committee are not to be 
applicable to the HKSar unless the nPCSC decides that specific conditions are met), 
provisions that regulate the activities of mainland Chinese units of government in 
Hong Kong and obliging mainland Chinese officers to obey the laws of the Sar while 
in Hong Kong, and provisions that appear to insulate the HKSar from the practice of 
the socialist system and policies.28 the nPC held that the Basic Law of the HKSar was 
constitutional “as it is enacted in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s 
republic of China and the specific conditions of Hong Kong. the systems, policies 
and laws to be instituted after the establishment of the [HKSar] shall be based on 
the Basic Law of the [HKSar].”29
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special administrative region of the People’s 
republic of China was adopted by the nPC on 4 april 1990, to be put into effect on 1 
July 1997, when the resumption of exercise of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong 
and the establishment of the HKSar would take place.30 the Basic Law of the macao 
27  See yash Ghai, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order 115–117 (2nd ed. 1999); Jason Buhi, Constitutional 
Asymmetry in the People’s Republic of China: Struggles of Autonomy Under a One-Party State in 
Constitutional Asymmetry in Multinational Federalism: Managing Multinationalism in Multi-Tiered 
Systems 105 (Patricia Popelier & maja Shadzic eds., 2019); Joseph Lian, What Is the Autonomy in the 
Mainland’s Law on Autonomy, Hong Kong econ. J. (2009) (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://hktext.
blogspot.com/2009/07/blog-post_9409.html. See also Cheng 2015, at 164–166.
28  yash Ghai characterized the provisions in the draft Basic Law as being “inconsistent” with the PrC 
Constitution and noted that there was a proposal in the course of the drafting process calling for 
the PrC Constitution to be amended to address the issue; see Ghai 1999, at 61–62, 178. Hualing Fu 
referred to this matter “as a particularly ambiguous point in the Basic Law” which had in fact been 
raised during the consultation process of the drafts of the Basic Law; see Hualing Fu, Supremacy of 
a Different Kind: The Constitution, the NPC, and the Hong Kong SAR in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate, 
supra note 13, at 97–111.
29  decision of the national People’s Congress on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special administrative 
region of the People’s republic of China, adopted at the third Session of the Seventh national People’s 
Congress on 4 april 1990. a similar decision was made by the nPC in respect of the Basic Law of the 
mSar on 31 march 1993.
30  the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special administrative region of the People’s republic of China, 
adopted at the third Session of the Seventh national People’s Congress on 4 april 1990; promulgated 
by the President of the People’s republic of China on 4 april 1990, 29 i.L.m. 1511 (1990).
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Special administrative region of the People’s republic of China were enacted by 
the nPC on 31 march 1993, to be put into effect on 20 december 1999, when the 
resumption of exercise of Chinese sovereignty over macau and the establishment 
of the mSar would take place.31
the establishment of the Sars under article 31 of the PrC Constitution and the 
enactment of the Basic Laws pursuant to article 31 produce a paradox over the 
implementation of the PrC Constitution in the Sars themselves. there had been disquiet 
in the Hong Kong legal sector since 1 July 1997 on the department of Justice’s act of 
including the PrC Constitution as a “constitutional instrument” in the department’s 
compilation of the Laws of the HKSar. a more relevant perspective has been the HKSar 
courts’ treatment of the PrC Constitution, which will be discussed below.
the approach of the Central authorities to this paradox of implementation at 
first was to refer to the relevant Basic Law only in its official pronouncements on the 
Sars. Since June 2014, after the publication by the State Council information office 
of a White Paper on the Practice of oCtS in the HKSar,32 the Central authorities have 
referred to the constitutional basis of the Sars to be the PrC Constitution and the 
relevant Basic Law. an important milestone in the development of this approach 
was the speech by President Xi Jinping in Hong Kong on 1 July 2017 at the meeting 
marking the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to the motherland and the 
inaugural Ceremony of the Fifth term Government of the HKSar. the President 
explained in the speech the constitutional basis of the HKSar is the Constitution 
and the Basic Law and underlined the exercise of jurisdiction over Hong Kong by the 
Central Government in accordance with the Constitution and the Basic Law.33 the 
HKSar Government had since obliged by issuing booklets of both the Constitution 
and the Basic Law.34 these recent official assertions and exertions to underline the 
Constitution as the “mother law” basis do not resolve the paradox satisfactorily. 
Questions have continued to be asked in Hong Kong over the extent in which the 
Constitution, a socialist instrument, is “applicable,” “effective” or “implemented” in 
the Sar, notwithstanding that it is the Basic Law that prescribes the systems and 
31  the Basic Law of the macao Special administrative region of the People’s republic of China, adopted 
at the First Session of the eighth national People’s Congress on 31 march 1993; promulgated by the 
President of the People’s republic of China on 31 march 1993. an english translation is available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mo/mo019en.pdf.
32  State Council information office, the Practice of the “one Country, two Systems” Policy in the Hong 
Kong Special administrative region, 10 June 2014 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.scio.gov.
cn/zfbps/ndhf/2014/document/1373163/1373163.htm.
33  Jinping Xi, Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong’s Return to the Motherland 
and the Inaugural Ceremony of the Fifth Term Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, China daily, 1 July 2017 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
hk20threturn/2017-07/01/content_29959860.htm.
34  the booklet is accessible from the HKSar Government’s Basic Law website (mar. 5, 2021), available 
at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/tc/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_tc.pdf.
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policies of the Sar, including the provision that socialist system and policies shall 
not be practised in the Sar.35 it was through the Basic Law and its interpretation and 
implementation locally in the Sar that the HKSar, particularly its courts, constructs 
its political, constitutional and legal identity distinct from that of the rest of the PrC,36 
and makes the claim that the Hong Kong jurisdiction enjoys judicial independence 
and autonomy and is the suitable and sustainable centre for resolving legal disputes 
for businesses in the asia-Pacific region and the Belt and road initiative, including 
cases involving a mainland Chinese entity.37
3. The Special Administrative Regions and the Basic Laws
the Sar’s administration of the relevant Basic Law was in beginning of the 
establishment of the Sars left largely a matter of “two Systems” and to the Sar’s 
established authorities. in the HKSar, the Basic Law of the HKSar has been regarded 
as a constitutional instrument, whose understanding and application had been 
informed by principles and values of constitutionalism.38 as Johannes m.m. Chan 
has demonstrated, certain principles or objectives, including those of preservation 
of the integrity of the common law system and its protective concern of freedoms 
and liberties enjoyed by the individual, maintenance and continuity of the previous 
systems and arrangements, and the separation of powers, have been underlined by 
the HKSar courts. Continuing from the previous common law based system and 
the practice of law in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Court of Final appeal (HKCFa) 
was able to lay down the judicial authority in the interpretation of the Basic Law 
in the HKSar and the courts’ general approach of interpretation of the Basic Law, 
including the adoption of a purposive approach towards interpretation in keeping 
with the nature of the Basic Law as a constitutional instrument, requiring the HKSar 
Government to justify a restriction of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by residents 
in the HKSar, and referring extensively to international and comparative materials, 
35  For a reiteration of the question, see Jasper yok-sing tsang, The Constitution’s Implementation, 14 march 
2019 (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.master-insight.com/憲法實施/. tsang, a former 
President of the Legislative Council of the HKSar, called for an authoritative, rigorous and comprehensive 
account on the question.
36  See, generally, Pui yin Lo, The Judicial Construction of Hong Kong’s Basic Law (2014); and Johannes m.m. 
Chan, Behind the Text of the Basic Law: Some Constitutional Fundamentals in The Invisible Constitution 
in Comparative Perspective, supra note 2, at 193.
37  See, e.g., teresa Cheng, Speech of the Secretary for Justice in the “The Belt and Road Initiative and Inter-
national Dispute Settlement” Panel Session at the Form on the Belt and Road Legal Cooperation, 2 July 
2018 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.doj.gov.hk/en/community_engagement/speeches/pdf/
sj20180702e1.pdf.
38  the final court of appeal of the mSar (tribunal de ultima instancia) has embarked on a similar trajec-
tory, at least where the matters in question were the judicial review of legislation and the application 
of proportionality as a standard of review; see Chen & Lo 2018.
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particularly in adjudications on protected fundamental rights and determining the 
appropriate judicial remedies.39
the running of the Sars by their respective institutions in their own ways had 
been left unhindered largely by the Central authorities unless an issue of substantive 
or vital importance arose. Whether an issue is of substantive or vital importance to 
the Central authorities is a function of socialist political ideology. as the resolution 
of such matters have turned out, the Central authorities have chosen the tools of 
socialist legality to address controversies and they have proved effective against the 
recalcitrant institutions of the HKSar, which happened to be the courts and the legal 
profession, both of which were and are bound to an ethos of the “rule of Law,” even 
though the means that have been used to procure their submission have had more 
to do with ruling by the Centre “in accordance with law” than any principles or values 
of constitutionalism that they wished to maintain and propagate in Hong Kong.
3.1. The Powers of the Central Authorities “in Accordance with” the Basic Laws
the first constitutional controversy in Hong Kong came from the HKCFa’s judg-
ment in the right of abode litigation in 1999. in this Ng Ka Ling judgment of 29 January 
1999, the HKCFa declined the request made on behalf of the HKSar Government to 
refer provision(s) of the Basic Law of the HKSar considered necessary for the adjudi-
cation to the nPCSC for interpretation and proceeded to interpret all the provisions 
concerned and then rejected the Government’s case.40
the HKSar Government’s request was made pursuant to the provision of the 
Basic Law of the HKSar on its interpretation, which first provides for the authority of 
the nPCSC to interpret the Basic Law and then provides that, in adjudicating cases, 
the HKSar courts are authorised by the nPCSC to interpret the provisions of the Basic 
Law on their own, except that the HKCFa is required to make a reference, before final 
adjudication, to the nPCSC regarding the interpretation of a Basic Law provision 
which is concerned with an affair that is the responsibility of the Central People’s 
Government or concerned with the relationship between the Central authorities and 
the HKSar, and whose interpretation is necessary for such final adjudication.41
39  Chan, Behind the Text of the Basic Law. the HKSar courts are enabled by the self-contained judicial 
system of the HKSar, which includes its own power of final adjudication, the delegated authority 
to interpret on its own provisions of the Basic Law that are within the autonomy of the HKSar, the 
authority to refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions, and the authority on the part 
of the Hong Kong Court of Final appeal to invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit 
on the Court as non-permanent judges: Basic Law of the HKSar, arts. 2, 19, 82, 84 & 85. For detailed 
discussions of the courts of the Hong Kong Sar, see Pui yin Lo, Hong Kong: Common Law Courts in China 
in Asian Courts in Context 183 (Jiunn-rong yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014); albert H.y. Chen & Pui 
yin Lo, Hong Kong’s Judiciary Under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in Asia-Pacific Judiciaries: Independence, 
Impartiality and Integrity 131 (Hoong P. Lee & marilyn Pittard eds., 2018).
40  See Chan, Behind the Text of the Basic Law, at 200–202.
41  Basic Law of the HKSar, art. 158.
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the HKCFa probably transgressed the rule for making a reference to the nPCSC 
for final interpretation before final adjudication, since one of the necessary provisions 
involved in the adjudication was arguably a provision concerned with the Central 
authorities and the HKSar. this could have been left to rest on the basis of respecting 
autonomy, had not the HKCFa asserted in the same judgment the “constitutional 
jurisdiction” to review whether an act of the nPC or the nPCSC is inconsistent with 
the Basic Law as part and parcel of the HKSar courts’ jurisdiction to enforce and 
interpret the Basic Law.42 officers of the Central authorities, including those Soviet-
educated legal scholars responsible for the drafting of the Basic Law,43 would have 
none of this sort of usurping checking of the supreme authority of the State, a clear 
violation of the precept of democratic centralism. the assertion was duly purged with 
the co-option of the Secretary for Justice of the HKSar Government, who applied to 
the HKCFa for a “clarification” of its judgment, and of the HKCFa, which duly issued 
on 26 February 1999 a “unanimous judgment” acknowledging that its jurisdiction to 
enforce and interpret the Basic Law “is derived from and is subject to the provisions of 
the Basic Law” and expressed its acceptance that “[it] cannot question [the authority 
of the nPCSC to make an interpretation under art. 158 which would have to be 
followed by the courts of the region] … the Court accepts that it cannot question, 
the authority of the [nPC] or the [nPCSC] to do any act which is in accordance with 
the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein.”44
although the HKCFa’s clarification clarified nothing,45 it was soon realized that the 
nPCSC would issue an interpretation at the request of the State Council in light of 
a report from the Chief executive of HKSar expressing “difficulties” in implementing 
the HKCFa’s judgment of 29 January 1999.46 the nPCSC interpretation of 26 June 
1999, which cited article 67(4) of the PrC Constitution and article 158(1) of the 
Basic Law of the HKSar, considered not only that the HKCFa had not sought an 
interpretation from the nPCSC before final adjudication when it should have but 
also that the HKCFa’s interpretation “is not consistent with the legislative intent.” the 
nPCSC then issued its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law to 
nullify and supersede the HKCFa’s interpretation of those provisions.47 Subsequently, 
the HKCFa announced in a judgment on 3 december 1999 that it accepted as binding 
42  Ng Ka Ling & Ors v. Director of Immigration (1999) 2 H.K.C.F.a.r. 4, 26 (C.F.a.).
43  the former drafters of the Basic Law who were upset by the HKCFa’s assertions included Wu Jianfan 
and Xiao Weiyun, both of whom received legal education in the Soviet union in the early 1950s. 
they and two other drafters, Shao tianren and Xu Chongde, made known of their displeasure to the 
Chinese official press; see Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 13, at 53–60.
44  Ng Ka Ling & Ors v. Director of Immigration (1999) 2 H.K.C.F.a.r. 141 (C.F.a.).
45  See also Chan, Paths of Justice, at 30–34.
46  See Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 13, at 474–477.
47  See Id. at 478–480.
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on the HKSar courts the nPCSC interpretation of 26 June 1999, suggesting that it 
stated what the Basic Law provisions concerned meant on the date of coming into 
operation of the Basic Law.48
the HKCFa judgments above have solidified into canon in the next 20 years, 
so much that nowadays, the HKSar courts believe that they are bound to enforce 
any interpretation adopted by the nPCSC49 and deny they could have jurisdiction to 
challenge the validity of a decision of the nPCSC.50 the HKSar courts have also resolved 
the ambiguity over the applicability of the PrC Constitution to adjudications in the 
HKSar by rejecting arguments that provisions of the PrC Constitution are “necessary 
irrelevant or should be ignored by the Hong Kong courts when adjudicating cases.”51
in the same period of time, the nPCSC had produced four more interpretations 
and seven more decisions, extending the reach of its powers from purporting to 
elucidate “legislative intention” of a provision of the Basic Law of the HKSar,52 to 
establishing the procedure and parameters for development of the political system 
of the HKSar,53 the authorization of the HKSar to exercise jurisdiction outside 
Sar territory on leased land in mainland China,54 the assertion of Central positions 
against the social movement for “Hong Kong independence” in political life in Hong 
Kong,55 and the purported approval, in exercise of the PrC Constitution’s power of 
supervising its implementation and of the Basic Law’s implied power of supervising its 
implementation, of a co-operation arrangement between mainland and the HKSar on 
the establishment of a mainland port at the West Kowloon Station of the high speed 
48  Lau Kong Yung & Ors v. Director of Immigration (1999) 2 H.K.C.F.a.r. 300 (C.F.a.).
49  See Chief Executive of the HKSAR v. President of the Legislative Council [2017] 1 H.K.L.r.d. 460 (C.a.); 
Secretary for Justice v. Leung Kwok Hung [2019] H.K.C.a. 173 (15 February 2019) (C.a.).
50  See Yau Wai Ching v. Chief Executive of the HKSAR (2017) 20 H.K.C.F.a.r. 390 (C.F.a.); Secretary for Justice 
v. Leung Kwok Hung, supra note 49; Leung Chung Hang Sixtus & Ors v. President of Legislative Council 
[2019] 1 H.K.L.r.d. 292 (C.F.i.).
51  See Leung Chung Hang Sixtus & Ors v. President of Legislative Council, supra note 50.
52  See the nPCSC interpretation of 27 april 2005 (on article 53 of the Basic Law) and the nPCSC 
interpretation of 26 august 2011 (on articles 13 and 19 of the Basic Law).
53  See the nPCSC interpretation of 6 april 2004 and decisions purported to be made under this 
interpretation and the decision(s) made under this interpretation, including the nPCSC decision 
of 31 august 2014, which set out restrictive terms under which the election of the candidate for 
appointment of the office of Chief executive by universal suffrage may be held.
54  See the nPCSC decision of 31 october 2006 on empowering the HKSar to exercise Jurisdiction over 
the Shenzhen Bay Port Hong Kong Port area.
55  See the nPCSC interpretation of 7 november 2016 of article 104 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special administrative region of the People’s republic of China, which not only was adopted in the 
course of legal proceedings in Hong Kong to apply relevant legislation to disqualify the relevant 
elected members of the Legislative Council on the ground that their oath-taking antics meant that 
they neglected to take the oath of office when called upon to do so, but also was produced to include 
a stipulation that would stymie any other persons who are adjudged to be unable to uphold the Basic 
Law and to swear allegiance to the HKSar of the PrC from standing in elections.
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rail link to mainland China in the middle of Hong Kong exercising exclusive mainland 
laws and jurisdiction therein.56 that the Central authorities have subdued the common 
law courts of the HKSar by invoking the marxist-Leninist-Stalinist features of the PrC 
State of interpretation of laws by the nPCSC57 and of the Soviet-statist institution of 
centralized supervision58 testifies not only to the potency of democratic centralism 
as a unified, absolute, undefined and unrestrained “reservoir” of power but also to 
the unwillingness and inability (if not ignorance) on the part of the HKSar courts to 
counter-act the nPCSC’s use of “legal tools” to control and rein in the systems of the 
HKSar, and to mitigate their effects on them.59 the countervailing approach should 
have been to maintain the separate systems provided for the HKSar pursuant to the 
Basic Law, at least in furthering the objects that socialist system and policies shall not 
be practised in the HKSar, there be a high degree of autonomy in the HKSar, and 
the rights and freedoms of all persons in the HKSar be safeguarded.60
the power of interpretation of the nPCSC to interpret provisions of the Basic 
Law of the HKSar at any time and with or without any request from the HKSar 
courts has qualified the rule of Law of the HKSar.61 yet, what has not been well 
56  See the nPCSC decision of 27 december 2017 on approving the Co-operation arrangement between 
the mainland and the Hong Kong Special administrative region on the establishment of the Port at 
the West Kowloon Station of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong express rail Link for implementing 
Co-location arrangement.
57  Hong Kong scholars had sought to discuss the supremacy of the nPCSC’s power of interpretation through 
the prism of constitutionalism in the wake of the controversy of the nPCSC interpretation of 26 June 1999; 
see, generally, Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 13. Hong Kong scholars began to underline 
the socialist and Soviet-statist roots of the power of nPCSC interpretation in 2007; see yash Ghai, The 
Political Economy of Interpretation in Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The Struggle for Coherence 115 
(Hualing Fu et al. eds., 2007); and Sophia Woodman, Legislative Interpretation by China’s National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee: A Power with Roots in the Stalinist Conception of Law in Id. at 229.
58  Partlett & ip 2016, at 482, 496–497, 509.
59  Senior judges and lawyers in Hong Kong have continued to address the PrC constitutional system as 
“mainland civil law system”; see Secretary for Justice v. Leung Kwok Hung [2019] H.K.C.a. 173 (15 February 
2019) (C.a.); Chief Executive of the HKSAR v. President of the Legislative Council [2017] 1 H.K.L.r.d. 460 (C.a.). 
they said so notwithstanding a legion of scholastic discussion; see Cora Chan, The Legal Limits on Beijing’s 
Powers to Interpret Hong Kong’s Basic Law, HKu Legal Scholarship Blog, 3 november 2016 (mar. 5, 2021), 
available at http://researchblog.law.hku.hk/2016/11/cora-chan-o%20n-legal-limits-of-beijings.html; 
Hualing Fu, Guide to Legislative Interpretation in China, HKu Legal Scholarship Blog, 19 July 2017 (mar. 5, 
2021), available at http://researchblog.law.hku.hk/2017/07/guide-to-legislative-interpretation-in.html; 
Jonathan Lam, Re-thinking the NPCSC’s Power to Interpret the Basic Law, 47 Hong Kong L.J. 825 (2017); eric C. 
ip, Interpreting Interpretations: A Methodology for the Judicial Enforcement of Legislative Interpretations of 
the Hong Kong Basic Law, 2017 Pub. L. 552 (2017); Feng Lin, The Duty of Hong Kong Courts to Follow the 
NPCSC’s Interpretation of the Basic Law: Are There Any Limits?, 48 Hong Kong L.J. 167 (2018); and Pui yin 
Lo, Enforcing an Unfortunate, Unnecessary and ‘Unquestionably Binding’ NPCSC Interpretation: The Hong 
Kong Judiciary’s Deconstruction of its Construction of the Basic Law, 48 Hong Kong L.J. 399 (2018).
60  the summation of Basic Law of the HKSar, arts. 4, 5, 11.
61  See anthony mason, The Rule of Law in the Shadow of the Giant: The Hong Kong Experience, 33(4) Syd. 
L. rev. 623 (2011).
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appreciated in Hong Kong by its legal elite is the fact that the Basic Law itself is 
replete with provisions designating, positioning and subordinating the HKSar in the 
system of statist administration and supervision of the PrC. article 12 of the Basic Law 
designates the HKSar, in terms of administrative division, as “a local administrative 
region” of the PrC, coming directly under the CPG. article 15 provides for the CPG’s 
power of appointment of the Chief executive and the principal officials of the 
HKSar Government, which implicates the concomitant power of dismissal. article 
17 provides for the nPCSC’s power to scrutinize legislations enacted by the HKSar 
in terms of conformity with provisions of the Basic Law concerning affairs within the 
responsibilities of the Central authorities or regarding the relationship between the 
Central authorities and the HKSar and to return any such legislation considered to 
be non-conforming in these respects, thereby invalidating it immediately. although 
article 18 provides for the general non-application of national laws for the purpose 
of ensuring the self-containing nature of the HKSar’s legal system, it enables the 
nPCSC to add national laws “relating to defence and foreign affairs as well as other 
matters outside the limits of the autonomy of the Region as specified by this Law,” and 
to decide on the existence of a state of emergency in the HKSar so as to enable 
relevant national laws to be applied in the HKSar. article 43 provides that the Chief 
executive of the HKSar, the head of the HKSar and the head of its Government, shall 
be accountable to the CPG and the HKSar in accordance with the Basic Law. Budgets 
and final accounts of the HKSar must be reported to the CPG for the record. the CPG 
is empowered under article 48(8) to issue directives to the Chief executive in respect 
of relevant matters provided for in the Basic Law and it is an incumbent function of the 
Chief executive to implement such a directive. Last but not least, pursuant to article 
90, senior judicial appointments and removals in the HKSar must be reported to the 
nPCSC for the record. Writing in 2002, Zhenmin Wang summarized most of the above 
powers in terms of the powers for the “organization” of the Sars and further discussed 
the resolution of the issue of “residual power” as between the Central authorities and 
the Sars in terms of article 2 of the Basic Laws stipulating that the high degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by the Sars being powers “delegated” by the Central authorities, 
article 12 signifying the Sar as being directly administered by the CPG, and of article 
20 empowering the Sars to “accept” additional powers from the Central authorities, 
thus indicating that the Central authorities retain the “residual powers.”62
if a study of the list of Central authorities’ power above has not enlightened the 
Hong Kong legal community of the PrC’s coding of centralization of powers in the 
Basic Law, the 2014 State Council’s White Paper on the Practice of the “One Country, 
Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should have.63 
62  Zhenmin Wang, Relationship Between the Chinese Central Authorities and Regional Governments of 
Hong Kong and Macao: A Legal Perspective 143–175 (2019).
63  i.e. State Council information office, supra note 32.
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the White Paper introduced the narrative of the Central Government exercising 
“overall jurisdiction” (quanmian guanzhi quan 全面管治權) over an Sar pursuant to 
the system of the Sar prescribed in the PrC Constitution and the Basic Law, with the 
Central Government having powers it would directly exercise, such as the powers of 
establishing the Sar and forming its organs of power, the functions of supporting 
and guiding the administration of the Chief executive and the Government of the 
Sar in accordance with law, the responsibility for foreign affairs relating to the Sar, 
the responsibility for the defence of the Sar, the nPCSC’s powers regarding the 
Sar, and the Central military Commission’s leadership of the garrison in the Sar; 
and the Sar being delegated with powers by the Central Government to enable 
it to exercise a high degree of autonomy in accordance with the law, subject to 
the Central Government’s power of oversight over the exercise of a high degree of 
autonomy in the Sar.
also, the White Paper made clear that the oCtS is predicated upon the PrC’s form 
and nature of its socialist state as well as its fundamental interests. it explained “one 
Country” in the following terms:
the “one country” means that within the PrC, the HKSar is an inseparable 
part and a local administrative region directly under China’s CPG. as a unitary 
state, China’s central government has comprehensive jurisdiction over 
all local administrative regions, including the HKSar. the high degree of 
autonomy of HKSar is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely 
from the authorization by the central leadership. the high degree of 
autonomy of the HKSar is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. 
it is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership. 
the high degree of autonomy of HKSar is subject to the level of the central 
leadership’s authorization. there is no such thing called “residual power.” With 
China’s Constitution stipulating in clear-cut terms that the country follows 
a fundamental system of socialism, the basic system, core leadership and 
guiding thought of the “one country” have been explicitly provided for. the 
most important thing to do in upholding the “one country” principle is to 
maintain China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and respect 
the country’s fundamental system and other systems and principles.
it then explained “two Systems” in “one Country” as follows:
the “two systems” means that, within the “one country” the main body of 
the country practices socialism, while Hong Kong and some other regions 
practise capitalism. the “one country” is the premise and basis of the “two 
systems,” and the “two systems” is subordinate to and derived from “one 
country.” But the “two systems” under the “one country” are not on a par 
with each other. the fact that the mainland, the main body of the country, 
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embraces socialism will not change. With that as the premise, and taking 
into account the history of Hong Kong and some other regions, capitalism 
is allowed to stay on a long-term basis. therefore, a socialist system by the 
mainland is the prerequisite and guarantee for Hong Kong’s practising 
capitalism and maintaining its stability and prosperity. For Hong Kong 
to retain its capitalist system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy with 
“Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong” according to the Basic Law, it 
must fully respect the socialist system practised on the mainland in keeping 
with the “one country” principle and, in particular, the political system and 
other systems and principles in practice. the mainland should respect and 
tolerate the capitalism embraced by Hong Kong while upholding its socialist 
system, and draw on the successful experience of Hong Kong in economic 
development and social management. only by respecting and learning from 
each other can the “two systems” in the “one country” coexist harmoniously 
and achieve common development.
oCtS being implemented by the Basic Law, enacted pursuant to the PrC Cons-
titution, the White Paper next called for “a full understanding of the provisions of 
the Basic Law,” which –
are not isolated from but interrelated with each other. each of these 
provisions must be understood in the context of the Basic Law and the HKSar 
system as a whole. the implementation of the Basic Law shows that if we 
comprehend individual provisions of the Basic Law in an isolated way without 
taking into account the Basic Law as a whole, stressing one aspect while 
ignoring others, ambiguity or even contentious interpretation will occur, 
which will severely hamper the implementation of the Basic Law. only by 
comprehensively understanding all the provisions of the Basic Law can we 
find that the HKSar system, along with all its components, is an integrated 
whole complementary to each other and that this system plays the role of 
protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents, 
and ensures the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.
interpretations of the nPCSC shall be followed and the fact that the nPCSC 
exercises the power of interpretation of the Basic Law in accordance with law “is aimed 
at maintaining the rule of law in Hong Kong, as it oversees HKSar’s implementation 
of the Basic Law and protects the high degree of autonomy of the region.”
Finally, the White Paper indicated that the systems and mechanisms in the 
implementation of the Basic Law would have to be further improved:
it is necessary to, with an eye to the lasting peace and order in Hong Kong, 
exercise well the power invested in the central government as prescribed in the 
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Basic Law and see to it that the relationship between the central government 
and HKSar is indeed brought onto a legal and institutionalized orbit.
the Basic Law has thus been explained as the instrument of the unitary socialist 
state of the PrC exercising overall and comprehensive jurisdiction over the Sar it 
establishes: each and every act of governance by the Central authorities has been 
done “in accordance with law.”
3.2. The Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government and the Management 
of the United Front
the CPG’s resident organ in the HKSar is the Liaison office. it evolved from the 
PrC’s representative institution in Hong Kong during the time of the British colonial 
administration, which operated in the guise of the Xinhua news agency Hong Kong 
Branch. By a notification to the HKSar Government in 1999, the CPG stated that the 
Liaison office’s functions include: (1) liaising with the office of the Commissioner 
of the ministry of Foreign affairs in the HKSar and with the Hong Kong Garrison 
of the Chinese People’s Liberation army; (2) contacting and assisting the relevant 
departments of mainland China in the administration of PrC-funded institutions 
in Hong Kong; (3) promoting exchanges and cooperation in economic, education, 
science, culture, sports and other fields between Hong Kong and mainland China; 
(4) liaising with people of all sectors of the Hong Kong community, enhancing 
exchanges between mainland China and Hong Kong and reflecting the opinions of 
Hong Kong residents about mainland China; (5) handling taiwan-related affairs;64 
and (6) undertaking other tasks assigned by the CPG.65 the organization chart of 
the Liaison office not only takes care of all these functions but also include specific 
divisions for propaganda and culture, communications with Hong Kong societies, 
communications on police matters, youth work, legal issues, and works based on 
the geographical divisions of Hong Kong island, Kowloon and new territories.
the Liaison office, like its predecessor, is also the base of the CPC’s operating 
unit in Hong Kong, namely the Hong Kong Work Committee. this work committee 
works under the direction and supervision of a coordination panel on Hong Kong 
and macao Work of the Central Committee of the CPC.66 although the CPC does not 
64  the authorities in taiwan are wary of the Liaison office’s taiwan-related functions, raising concerns that 
officials from taiwan visiting the premises of the Liaison office might signal acceptance of the PrC’s 
application of the oCtS model for reunification of taiwan; see Han’s visit to Beijing offices “Politically 
Sensitive”: maC, Focus taiwan, 27 march 2019 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://focustaiwan.tw/news/
acs/201903270012.aspx.
65  Wang 2019, at 241–242.
66  the first panel on Hong Kong and macao work was established by the Central Committee of the CPC in 1978; 
see CPC Central decides to establish Hong Kong and macao Panel on 12 august 1978 (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 
2021), available at http://www.todayonhistory.com/8/12/ZhongyangJuedingChengLiGangaoXiaoZu.
html. the Central Committee’s panel is customarily chaired by a member of the Politburo and the 
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operate openly in Hong Kong, it is clear that officers of the Liaison office are part of 
a “second governance team,”67 functioning in an equal (if not higher) profile with the 
HKSar Government, discharging tasks of coordination that the HKSar Government 
might feel constrained from performing due to its imperative of maintaining an 
appearance of political neutrality in the watch of the various political factions in 
Hong Kong and of the international diplomatic corps and press stationed in Hong 
Kong. these efforts have reportedly included collecting views from individuals of 
various sectors of the community and offering patronage to selected “patriots” in 
various roles including appointments to political consultative conferences at the 
national and regional levels and electoral prospects to the Hong Kong delegation 
to the nPC,68 coordinating the “pro-establishment” political factions in Hong Kong to 
attain the maximum number of seats in open elections in Hong Kong, mobilizing the 
considerable manpower and other resources associated with the many PrC-funded 
corporations and businesses in Hong Kong69 and the social organizations affiliated 
with the Hong Kong patriotic front in elections and the public debate of social and 
political issues, furthering the propaganda work undertaken by mass media outlets, 
present head is Han Zheng, the first vice-Premier; see Kimmy Chung, Chinese Vice-Premier Han Zheng 
the “Right” Man in Charge of Hong Kong Affairs as City Shuns Political Gridlock for Economic Growth, South 
China morning Post, 28 June 2018 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/
politics/article/2152765/chinese-vice-premier-han-zheng-right-man-charge-hong-kong. For a history 
of the activities of the CPC in Hong Kong, see Christine Loh, Underground Front: The Chinese Communist 
Party in Hong Kong (2nd ed. 2018).
67  the notion of the “second governance team” consisting of mainland Chinese cadres was first men-
tioned by Cao erbao, the then head of research division of the Liaison office, in a news article in 
2008; see Loh 2018, at 3. an english translation is available at http://www.civicparty.hk/cp/media/
pdf/090506_cao_eng.pdf. Jie Cheng wrote subsequently to confirm the raising of this notion as an 
indicium of a change in policy of the CPC towards Hong Kong; see Jie Cheng, The Story of a New Policy, 
Hong Kong J. (2009) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.hkbasiclaw.com/Hong%20Kong%20
Journal/Cheng%20Jie%20article.htm.
68  this is the long hand for the traditional labour intensive “united Front” work of co-optation and 
persuasion; see Loh 2018, at 27–41. an achievement of the “united Front” efforts in the legal sector 
was the co-optation of a serving Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar association to serve in the 
Guangdong Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; see Chairman 
appointed Guangdong Political Consultative Conference member, Hong Kong Bar association 
“Fallen,” apple daily, 16 January 2008 (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at s.nextmedia.com/apple/a.
php?i=20080116&sec_id=4104&s=0&a=10649375.
69  Joseph Lian has pointed out that party organizations are established not only in the PrC’s state-
owned enterprises and state-funded corporations, but also in non-state firms (including foreign 
companies), creating a party-corporate complex in the Chinese economy: yi-Zheng Lian, China, the 
Party-Corporate Complex, new york times, 12 February 2017 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/02/12/opinion/china-the-party-corporate-complex.html. Lian also pointed to 
the activities of state owned enterprises in Hong Kong of pressuring their employees to vote for 
certain candidates in elections and of mainland Chinese money serving to restrict civil society and 
communal movements in Hong Kong, suggesting that the purchase of local assets by foreign and 
mainland capital should be regulated by law; see yi-Zheng Lian, Red Capital in Hong Kong, new york 
times, 1 June 2017 (mar. 5, 2021), available at www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/opinion/red-capital-
in-hong-kong-china-investment.html.
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publishing houses, and bookstores (some of which are in fact owned indirectly by the 
Liaison office),70 and supporting counter-groups organized to oppose civil society 
organizations or mass movements in Hong Kong.71
a more recent trend from the CPC and the CPG’s station in Hong Kong involves the 
Liaison office’s director or spokesperson making speeches and issuing statements 
on matters of public concern in Hong Kong.72 From the perspective of democratic 
centralism, this has to be regarded as an assertion of leadership and ideological 
tutelage over the official governmental institutions of the HKSar. While the CPC 
has not “come out” in Hong Kong yet, it is clear that it is a pervasive presence in 
Hong Kong, with its policies to be learned by all concerned with the administration 
of the HKSar.73
3.3. The “Chief Executive-led” Government as the Accountable Proxy
the CPC and the Central authorities’ consistent rhetoric has been to express 
support the Chief executive of the HKSar in his or her law-based governance of Hong 
Kong and fulfillment of the constitutional responsibility of safeguarding “China’s 
sovereignty, security and development interests.”74 this is well understood in relation 
to the Chief executive’s status and wide-ranging functions under the Basic Law and 
HKSar legislation, which include recommending individuals for appointment as 
principal officials, appointing judges, specifying the dates of general elections of the 
Legislation Council and convening its sessions, and introducing Bills and budgets 
70  See Blake Schmidt, The Publishing Empire Helping China Silence Dissent in Hong Kong, Bloomberg, 18 au- 
gust 2020 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-08-17/the-
publishing-empire-helping-china-silence-dissent-in-hong-kong.
71  Loh 2018, at 202–244.
72  See, e.g., Speech of Luo Huining on the event of the 2020 national Security education day for all in 
Hong Kong, 15 april 2020 (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.locpg.gov.cn/jsdt/2020-
04/15/c_1210558684.htm; LoC Spokesman: We Support the establishment and improvement of 
an education System Compatible with “one Country, two Systems” in the HKSar, 12 June 2020 
(in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.locpg.gov.cn/jsdt/2020-06/12/c_1210657773.
htm; LoC Spokesman: the disqualification by returning officers in accordance with Law of Some 
Candidates for the Legislative Council election deserves to be resolutely Supported, 30 July 2020 (in 
Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.locpg.gov.cn/jsdt/2020-07/30/c_1210727946.htm; 
and Let Patriotism Flourish in Hong Kong: remarks by Luo Huining, director of the Liaison office of 
the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special administrative region, at the Gala in 
Celebration of the 71st anniversary of the Founding of the People’s republic of China, 30 September 
2020 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.locpg.gov.cn/jsdt/2020-10/01/c_1210825856.htm.
73  the CPC Central Committee dispatched a “publicity” delegation in 2017 to Hong Kong to explain 
the report of General Secretary Xi Jinping to the 19th national Congress of the CPC to the HKSar 
Government; see Government Holds Seminar on 19th national Congress, Press release of the 
Government of the Hong Kong Special administrative region, 23 november 2017 (mar. 5, 2021), 
available at www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201711/23/P2017112300748.htm.
74  See State Council information office, supra note 32; Jinping Xi, supra note 33; and Jinping Xi, Secure 
a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great 
Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (18 October 2017) 67 (2018).
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into the Legislative Council and signing the enacted legislation and approved budget 
into effect, as well as his or her constitutional responsibility for the implementation 
of the Basic Law and CPG’s directives in Hong Kong, and his or her constitutional 
accountability to the CPG, both under the Basic Law and in respect of his or her 
appointment by the CPG.75 Hence there is in place a system for the Chief executive 
to make verbal and written reports to the CPG on work, which had been used 
for different purposes to connect the Sar with the Central authorities, including 
petitioning the Central authorities for an interpretation of a provision of the Basic 
Law or a decision on the next step in the development of the political system,76 and 
signifying openly Central support of a decision made by the Chief executive.77
Political support of the Chief executive is coupled with theoretical insistence on 
the core position of the Chief executive in the Sar system based on oCtS. deng 
Xiaoping stated in 1987 in a meeting with members of the Basic Law drafting 
Committee that “it would not be appropriate for [Hong Kong’s system] to copy those 
of Britain and the united States with, for example, separation of the three powers” 
(sanquan fenli 三權分立).78 Since then, mainland officials and scholars have taken 
care not to use the term ‘separation of the three powers’ to characterise the political 
system established by the Basic Law. on completion of the drafting process of the 
Basic Law, Ji Pengfei, Chairman of the Basic Law drafting Committee, explained 
the draft Basic Law to the nPC session that enacted the Basic Law in april 1990: 
“the executive authorities and the legislature should regulate each other as well 
as co-ordinate their activities.” the Chief executive, as the head of the Sar and its 
Government who is accountable to the CPG and the Sar, “must have real power 
which, at the same time, should be subject to some restrictions.”79
75  article 73(9) of the Basic Law provides for the impeachment of the Chief executive by the Legislative 
Council but a Chief executive so impeached is not removed by operation of law; the impeachment 
must be reported to the CPG for decision. on the other hand, article 52(2) and (3) requires the Chief 
executive to resign to resolve an impasse between him or her and the Legislative Council, one that 
continues to persist in spite of dissolution and fresh elections of the latter.
76  two nPCSC interpretations, adopted in 1999 and in 2005 respectively, were initiated by a report from 
the Chief executive/acting Chief executive. nPCSC decisions on further development of the HKSar’s 
political system in 2004, 2007 and 2014 were adopted after the submission of a report of the Chief 
executive pursuant to a procedure prescribed under the nPCSC interpretation of 6 april 2004.
77  the CPG issued a state letter (Guo Kan) to the Chief executive on 26 February 2019 in light of the Chief 
executive in Council dismissing the appeal by the Hong Kong national Party against the decision 
of the Secretary for Security to prohibit its operation under HKSar laws; see Jeffie Lam et al., Beijing 
Backs City Government’s Ban on Hong Kong National Party, Leader Carrie Lam Says, South China morning 
Post, 26 February 2019 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/
article/2187744/beijing-backs-city-governments-ban-hong-kong-national-party.
78  Deng Xiaoping on the Question of Hong Kong, supra note 12, at 55.
79  Pengfei Ji, Explanations on “The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China (Draft)” and its Related Documents, third Session of the Seventh national 
People’s Congress, China, 28 march 1990 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/
en/basiclawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc10.pdf.
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL     Volume IX (2021) Issue 2 114
However, as enacted, the Basic Law’s provisions do reflect, to lawyers and scholars 
schooled in the common law tradition, an institutional and functional separation 
of powers. HKSar judges have in fact interpreted the Basic Law as incorporating 
a doctrine of separation of powers and applied it as a feature of Hong Kong’s rule 
of Law in the adjudication of cases concerning the balance of powers between the 
HKSar’s coordinate branches of government and how prepared the judicial authority 
is to check or supervise them.80
that had not appealed to mainland Chinese legal scholars and members of the 
former Basic Law drafting Committee, who advocated that the key term that would 
correctly characterise the political system of the HKSar is “executive-led government” 
(xingzheng zhudao行政主導, also translated as “executive dominance”).81 Hong Kong 
academics had publicly challenged this notion in response.82 official support of the 
mainland characterization came in 2007, when Wu Bangguo, the then Chairman of 
the nPCSC, expressed the view that a key characteristic of the political system of the 
Hong Kong Sar is “executive-led government” with the Chief executive as the core (yi 
xingzheng zhangguan wei hexin de xingzheng zhudao以行政長官為核心的行政主導).83 
in July 2010, Qiao Xiaoyang, the then deputy Secretary-General of the nPCSC, noted 
in a speech in macau that while there exists a kind of division of power within the 
political system prescribed by the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Basic Law of 
macau, it would be wrong to act on the basis of the concept of “separation of the three 
powers” instead of the actual provisions of the Basic Law, which ought to be read as 
“a socialist document” with a political system of “executive-led government.”84
General Secretary and President Xi Jinping, in the report to the 19th national 
Congress of the CPC on 18 october 2017, referred to the oCtS policy as an integral 
component of “Xi Jinping’s thought on Chinese-style Socialism for the new age.” Xi 
reiterated that the Chief executive of the Sar occupies the core of its political system.85 
the imprint of this matter as part of the paramount guiding ideology of the PrC has 
concluded the discussion.
80  See Pui yin Lo & albert H.y. Chen, The Judicial Perspective of “Separation of Powers” in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 5(2) J. int’l Comp. L. 337 (2018).
81  Introduction to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 345–350 (Shu-wen 
Wang ed., 2nd ed. 2009); Weiyun Xiao, On the Hong Kong Basic Law 640–644 (2003); and albert Chen, 
“Executive-Led Government”, Strong and Weak Governments and “Consensus Democracy” in Hong Kong’s 
Constitutional Debate, supra note 13, at 9.
82  See Lo 2014, at 42–46.
83  Bangguo Wu, Enforce the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Depth, Push Forward 
the Grand Implementation of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ national People’s Congress, 6 June 2007 (in 
Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2007-06/06/content_639111.htm.
84  Qiao Xiaoyang, Studying the Basic Law, Upgrading the Quality of Civil Servants: A Speech at the Graduation 
Ceremony of the “Advanced Course of the Basic Law of MSAR,” 6 acad. J. of one Country, two Systems 
1, 4 (2010).
85  Jinping Xi, supra note 74.
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3.4. National Economic and Social Development Planning and the Greater 
Bay Area
the CPC has been the vanguard of national economic and social development; 
this has been achieved through its proposal and steering of periodic national 
economic and social development plans. State planning, or macro-regulation and 
control, is plainly a principal feature of the socialist market economy practised in 
China, with the state-owned economy being the leading force and the state being 
responsible for its consolidation and growth.86 every five years, the nPC adopts 
a national economic and social development plan for the PrC.87
Since the 12th Five year Plan for economic and Social development of the People’s 
republic of China (2010–2015), the HKSar and the mSar have been included as part 
of the plan with their separate chapter. although one part of the chapter repeats 
the basic premises of oCtS, the Basic Law and support of the Sar Government, the 
remainder of the chapter describes the Sars as having positions and roles in the 
PrC’s economic development and opening up, outlines the economic strengths and 
designations of the HKSar and mSar and the economic sectors and initiatives that 
are to be developed in each of the Sars, plus an emphasis in deepening cooperation 
between the Chinese mainland (particularly the neighbouring Guangdong Province) 
and the Sars.88
While the Sars had since 2003 been having strengthened trade and investment 
cooperation under the framework of bilateral Closer economic Partnership 
arrangements, they were adopted in the form of free trade agreements between 
customs territories and members of the World trade organization as voluntary 
agreements for trade facilitation.89 inclusion of the Sars in national economic and 
social development planning is another matter, bearing in mind that what the nPC 
has gone beyond the economic and financial cooperation and facilitation between 
the Chinese mainland and the Sars and into matters of cooperation on social 
development, living standards, culture, education, environmental protection, and 
other areas, as well as promotion of a quality living area in the Greater Pearl river 
delta region and advancing the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-macao 
Greater Bay area.
86  PrC Constitution, arts. 6, 7, 15.
87  as to the recent state planning process by the five-year plans, see Sebastian Heilmann, Red Swan: How 
Unorthodox Policy Making Facilitated China’s Rise 155–158, 173–194 (2018).
88  the 12th Five year Plan for economic and Social development of the People’s republic of China (2010–
2015), Ch. 57; and the 13th Five year Plan for economic and Social development of the People’s republic of 
China (2016–2020), Ch. 54 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policyrelease_8233/201612/
P020191101482242850325.pdf.
89  See Wenwei Guan, China’s Free Trade from SEZs to CEPA and FTZs: The Beijing Consensus in Global 
Convergence and Divergence in Chinese Legal Reform and the Global Legal Order: Adoption and 
Adaptation 104 (yun Zhao & michael ng eds., 2018).
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the Greater Bay area project of developing nine areas of Guangdong Province, 
Hong Kong and macao into a regional grouping rivaling regions such as the Silicon 
valley is an ambitious national strategy personally conceived, deployed and advanced 
by President Xi.90 it involves not only infrastructure projects like the Hong Kong-
Zhuhai-macao Bridge and the Guangdong-Shenzhen-Hong Kong express rail Link, 
but, more importantly, harmonization for the purpose of removing barriers in the 
movement of people, capital and information,91objectives that might go beyond 
the commonplace regional planning efforts.92 the outline development Plan for 
this Greater Bay area, unveiled on 18 February 2019, is all encompassing, covering 
innovation and technology, infrastructural connectivity, modern manufacturing and 
service provision, ecological conservation, education and talents, culture and leisure, 
employment and entrepreneurship, health, social security and social governance, and 
servicing the Belt and road initiative and global competitiveness. as to how all these 
developments are to be implemented, a central leading group for the development 
of this Greater Bay area has been established, “relevant central ministries” would 
formulate “concrete policies and measures,” keep track of progress in implementation, 
conduct evaluation and assessments and put forward proposals for refinement, 
timely reports on major issues would be made to the CPC Central Committee and 
the State Council, and there is recognized in the outline development Plan that 
there have to be “breakthroughs in systems and mechanisms.”93 if the centralized 
coordination experienced in regional planning and the “crisis mode” leadership 
approach of President Xi are to serve as references, economic development in Hong 
Kong would henceforth be subject to guidance at the national level, with the HKSar 
Government producing initiatives and implementations that would serve the macro-
regulatory imperatives; it is up to the HKSar Government to recognize leeway for 
experiment and innovation, albeit under the purview of the leading group.94 this is 
somewhat a contradiction, for innovation and global competitiveness to be planned 
and implemented from top-down.
a greater contradiction in these Centre-planned economic and social deve-
lopments for Hong Kong lies in their imposition of the national socialist system on 
90  See Jinping Xi, supra note 74, at 68; and office of the Leading Group for development of the Guan-
gdong-Hong Kong-macao Greater Bay area: Building international First Class Bay area, advance 
Livelihood Benefits, People’s daily, 19 February 2019 (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://
cpc.people.com.cn/BiG5/n1/2019/0219/c64387-30804195.html.
91  See Ben Bland, Greater Bay Area: XI Jinping’s Other Grand Plan, Financial times, 3 September 2018 (mar. 5, 
2021), available at www.ft.com/content/fe5976d8-ab81-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c.
92  See Heilmann 2018, at 159–164.
93  See outline development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-macao Greater Bay area, 18 February 
2019 (english translation) (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.bayarea.gov.hk/filemanager/en/
share/pdf/outline_development_Plan.pdf.
94  See Heilmann 2018, at 188–189, 200–211.
PUI-YIN LO 117
a regional economy and society that is guaranteed by its foundational law to be 
capitalist with its own way of life.95 But that is a contradiction that will be celebrated 
and not condemned in Hong Kong, so long as tangible benefits could be yielded in 
the result to some, and hopefully the better, quarters of the Hong Kong community.96 
in any event, Hong Kong has become increasingly dependent on the PrC’s economy 
and economic and financial policies,97 and the servicing of the PrC’s needs in the 
global economy.98 a pure and principled approach in the implementation of the 
Basic Law is not to be a hinderance to “development” and “progress” preferred by 
the Central leadership and adopted by the Sar’s governmental elites.
3.5. The Hong Kong National Security Law
Both the Basic Law of the HKSar and the Basic Law of the mSar provides that 
the Sar “shall” enact, “on its own,” legislation to prohibit specified categories of acts 
endangering national security.99 However, while the mSar has discharged this “cons-
titutional duty” to enact national security legislation in 2009,100 and has established 
a Commission on the defence of national Security since 2018,101 the HKSar has not 
been able to enact national security legislation since its establishment in 1997.
as it is well known, Hong Kong was in civil unrest in the latter half of 2019 due to 
the escalated the “anti-extradition law” protests. in the midst of the confrontations, 
Hong Kong police used multiple types non-lethal and chemical ammunition. 
Protestors responded with bricks, slingshots, high-powered laser pointers, sharpened 
objects and petrol bombs. in addition, on 1 July 2019, protestors stormed into the 
chamber of the HKSar’s Legislative Council and caused significant damage to the 
building and facilities there. and, on 21 July 2019, protestors besieged the building 
of the Liaison office and, in the course of the event, defaced the national emblem. 
95  Basic Law of the HKSar, art. 5.
96  Some quarters in the Hong Kong community will lament over the loss of Hong Kong identity and 
distinctiveness in the development and consequential subsuming of Hong Kong into the Greater Bay 
area; see agnes Ku, Identity as Politics: Contesting the Local, the National and the Global in Routledge 
Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong 451 (tai-lok Lui et al. eds., 2019).
97  See yun-wing Sung, Becoming Part of One National Economy: Maintaining Two Systems in the Midst of 
the Rise of China in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, supra note 96, at 66.
98  See david meyer, Hong Kong: China’s Global City in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, 
supra note 96, at 414; and Ho-fung Hung, Chinese State Capitalism in Hong Kong in Id. at 430.
99  Basic Law of the HKSar, art. 23 and Basic Law of the mSar, art. 23.
100  See Lei relativa à defesa da segurança do Estado (Lei no 2/2009) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://
images.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2009/09/lei-2-2009.pdf. english translation of Lei no 2/2009 is available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/macau-special-administrative-region-national-
security-law-chinese-and.
101  See national Security defence Commission Holds this year’s 2nd Session, macaonews, 25 September 
2020 (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://macaonews.org/national-security-defence-commission-holds-
this-years-2nd-session/.
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on a weekly basis between July and november 2019, hundreds and thousands of 
Hong Kong residents participated in strikes, vandalism, street battles, obstruction 
of vital infrastructure including the Hong Kong international airport, the metro 
system, and the cross-harbour tunnel, and occupation of university campuses. the 
protests divided Hong Kong society; there were occasions of lynching of individuals 
and damaging and looting of shop premises.102
the CPC decided to act. on 31 october 2019, the fourth plenary session of the 
19th Central Committee of the CPC adopted the decision of the Central Committee 
Plenary Session on several important questions on upholding and improving the 
Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and advancing the modernization of 
the national governance system and governance ability. Section 12 of the decision 
concerned the system of “one Country, two Systems.” it elaborated on the matter 
of improving the system for the Central authorities to exercise comprehensive 
jurisdiction over the Sars in accordance with the Constitution and the Basic Law 
for the purposes of staunchly safeguarding national sovereignty, security and 
development interests and safeguarding the long-term prosperity and stability 
of the Sars, and ensuring no tolerance of any act that challenges the bottom line 
of “one Country, two Systems” or undermining national unification. it stated that 
such improvements would involve, among others, establishing and improving the 
legal system and enforcement mechanism of the Sars for safeguarding national 
security; supporting the strengthening of the power of law enforcement of the 
Sars, strengthening education on the Constitution, the Basic Law, the national 
condition, Chinese history and Chinese culture in Hong Kong society (particularly 
in relation to public servants and young people) so that the national awareness and 
patriotism of Hong Kong compatriots would be enhanced; and resolutely preventing 
and restraining external forces from interfering in Hong Kong affairs and conducting 
separatist, subversive, infiltrating and sabotage activities, so that Hong Kong would 
have long term governance and order.103
the 2020 nPC Session, which was delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic, adopted 
a decision on 28 may 2020 to instruct the HKSar to complete the national security 
102  For chronologies of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests prepared by news media and nGos, see, e.g., new 
york times (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/hong-
kong-protests-arc.html; and Human rights in China (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.hrichina.
org/en/2019-hong-kong-protests-timeline. the HKCFa has also summarized “the degeneration of law 
and order in Hong Kong and the ever-increasing violence and lawlessness” in Hong Kong between 
June and november 2019 in its judgment in Kwok Wing Hang & Ors v. Chief Executive in Council & Anor 
[2020] H.K.C.F.a. 42 (21 december 2020) [87]–[97].
103  See the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several important 
Questions on upholding and improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and 
advancing the modernization of the national Governance System and Governance ability, adopted 
by the Fourth Plenary Session of the nineteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on 31 october 2019, Xinhuanet, 5 november 2019 (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://
www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-11/05/c_1125195786.htm.
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legislation stipulated in the Basic Law of the HKSar at an earlier date, require the 
HKSar’s administrative, legislative and judicial organs to effectively prevent, stop 
and punish acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations, direct the HKSar to strengthen the enforcement 
forces for safeguarding national security and step up enforcement to safeguard 
national security, and entrust the nPCSC with the formulation of laws for the HKSar 
for the purpose of effectively preventing, stopping and punishing acts that seriously 
endanger national security and activities of foreign or external forces interfering in 
the affairs of the Hong Kong Sar.104 the nPCSC did so on 30 June 2020 by enacting 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKnSL) and then decided to apply the HKnSL to 
the HKSar by adding it to annex iii to the Basic Law of HKSar. the Chief executive 
of the HKSar promulgated the HKnSL by notice on the same day for the HKnSL to 
apply to Hong Kong.105
the HKnSL, drafted in the lexicon of law-making in mainland China,106 serves 
to: (1) establish general principles and duties in relation to safeguarding national 
security for the Hong Kong Sar and its residents;107 (2) establish institutions of the 
Hong Kong Sar for safeguarding national security, including the pivot government 
body of the Committee for Safeguarding national Security (CSnS) chaired by the 
Chief executive of the HKSar and advised by a national Security adviser;108 (3) 
establish the office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Sar 
for safeguarding national security (CPGnSo);109 (4) Prescribe criminal offences of 
104  See decision of the national People’s Congress on establishing and improving the Legal System and 
enforcement mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special administrative region to Safeguard national 
Security, adopted at the third Session of the thirteenth national People’s Congress on 28 may 2020 
(mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/a215.
105  See Promulgation of national Law 2020 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/
hk/a406. For an unofficial english translation of the HKnSL, see Gazette of the Hong Kong Special 
administrative region (Gn (e) 72 of 2020) (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/
pdf/20202448e/egn2020244872.pdf.
106  article 64 of the HKnSL is a glossary provision that translates some of the penal terms used in the 
HKnSL to refer to specified terms used in the criminal law and criminal procedure legislation of the 
HKSar.
107  HKnSL, Ch. i.
108  HKnSL, Ch. ii. the CSnS performs these functions: (1) analyzing and assessing the situation of Hong 
Kong, making work plans and formulating policies, in relation to safeguarding national security; 
(2) advancing the development of the legal system and enforcement mechanisms of the HKSar 
for safeguarding national security; and (3) coordinating major work and significant operations for 
safeguarding national security in the HKSar. the current national Security adviser is Luo Huining, 
the director of the Liaison office, who is also a deputy director of the State Council Hong Kong and 
macao affairs office and a member of the Central Committee of the CPC.
109  HKnSL, Ch. v. the CPGnSo is staffed with officers of the Chinese Public Security ministry and State 
Security ministry and performs the functions of analysis and assessment of the Hong Kong situation 
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secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with a foreign country or external 
elements to endanger national security;110 and (5) Prescribe the framework for the 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of those offences in the Hong Kong Sar, 
as well as the circumstances and framework for the CPGnSo to exercise jurisdiction in 
the Hong Kong Sar and the subsequent prosecution and adjudicate of the relevant 
case by the Chinese procuratorate and court.111
the HKnSL is a striking piece of national law enacted for implementation in the 
HKSar. it expressly and directly establishes government bodies of the HKSar, and 
also a CPG body in the HKSar, for safeguarding national security, and stipulates that 
these bodies are answerable to the CPG and not subject to any form of check, scrutiny 
and accountability under the systems of the Basic Law of the HKSar. the HKnSL also 
provides for a self-contained penal code for safeguarding national security that the 
HKSar and mainland Chinese authorities specified under it, including the courts 
of the HKSar, would apply according to its language and the particular context 
for effective and full enforcement so as to prevent, suppress and punish any act 
or activity endangering national security in Hong Kong.112 to ensure that every 
individual and organization in Hong Kong recognizes the importance of national 
security and complies with the HKnSL, article 6 of the HKnSL imposes on everyone 
in the HKSar the duty to abide by the HKnSL and the laws of HKSar that safeguard 
national security and requires a resident of the Hong Kong Sar who stands for 
election or assumes public office to confirm in writing or take an oath to uphold the 
Basic Law of the HKSar and swear allegiance to the HKSar in accordance with the 
law. and to make sure that even the judges and lawyers of the HKSar understand, 
article 2 of the HKnSL interprets the Basic Law of the HKSar to indicate that those 
Basic Law provisions on the legal status of the HKSar as an inalienable part of China 
and a local administrative region coming directly under the CPG are “fundamental 
provisions” of the Basic Law and that no institution, organization or individual in the 
HKSar shall contravene these provisions in exercising their rights and freedoms.113
for providing opinions and making proposals on strategy and policy for safeguarding national 
security in the HKSar, overseeing, guiding, coordination and supporting the HKSar in performing 
its duties for safeguarding national security, collecting and analyzing intelligence and information 
concerning nationals security, and handling cases concerning an offence endangering national 
security upon the approval of the CPG.
110  HKnSL, Ch. iii.
111  HKnSL, Chs. iv & v.
112  article 62 of the HKnSL establishes the “prevailing” status of the HKnSL over provisions of the local 
laws of the HKSar that are inconsistent with it.
113  this provision may control the proper understanding and application of article 4 of the HKnSL (which 
provides that human rights shall be respected and protected in safeguarding national security in 
the HKSar); and article 5 of the HKnSL (which provides that the principle of the rule of law shall be 
adhered to in preventing, suppressing and punishing crimes of endangering national security, and 
highlights several principles of criminal justice, including the principle that a person is presumed 
innocent until convicted by a judicial body).
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Whilst the HKnSL, as described above, has a profound effect on the existing 
political, legal and judicial systems of the HKSar provided under the Basic Law of the 
HKSar, this is because the HKnSL adds a layer of governmental responsibilities and 
powers to the HKSar. more importantly, the Central authorities entrusts, through 
the HKnSL, the primary operational duties with the CSnS, the Chief executive of 
the HKSar and the investigatory and prosecutorial bodies of the HKSar, with the 
CPGnSo serving as the support and in particularly rare circumstances, the substitute 
enforcement body on the ground. the courts of the HKSar, too, must adjudicate 
cases of endangering national security in accordance with the applicable law. Hong 
Kong people continues to rule Hong Kong, albeit with a bigger stick. From this 
perspective, it is strange to find foreign governments condemning the HKnSL as 
diminishing the HKSar’s “high degree of autonomy.”114
Conclusion
Communism prospered on Chinese soil possibly, in part, due to the attraction of 
some of its sloganized propositions, such as equality (均) and commonness (公), to 
the intelligentsia educated in the Confucian tradition.115 the CPC captured the hearts 
and minds of the educated class longing for a force of change to save China from 
domestic turmoil and foreign aggression.116 the CPC went on to defeat all opposition 
and achieve governance of the land mass of China. the CPC has adopted the twin 
goals of realizing Communism and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, to be 
achieved through establishing socialism as China’s basic system and advancing 
socialist construction, a great project in a great struggle to realize a great dream.117
Commentators are now beginning to consider China a “civilizational state,” in 
the sense of the Chinese State’s ability to apply China’s cultural self-sufficiency to 
further the agenda of internal governance and external influence, to the extent of 
at least constructing an alternative discourse competing with and even excepting 
or departing from internationally recognized or universal norms or values.118 Before 
114  See, e.g., uK Foreign, Commonwealth and development office, the Six-monthly report on Hong Kong 
1 January to 30 June 2020, 23 november 2020 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/937162/Hong_Kong_
Six_monthly_report_January_-_June_2020.pdf.
115  See ying-shih yu, The Memoirs of Yu Ying-Shih 49–53 (2018) (in Chinese).
116  another contributing factor was personality and idealism surrounding mao Zedong; see Julia Lovell, 
Maoism: A Global History (2019).
117  See Jinping Xi, supra note 74, at 16–19; and Jinping Xi, On Several Questions Concerning the Insistence 
and Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, 7 Qiu Shi (2019) (in Chinese) (mar. 5, 2021), 
available at www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-03/31/c_1124302776.htm.
118  See Weiwei Zhang, The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State (2012); Weiwei Zhang, The China Horizon: 
Glory and Dream of a Civilizational State (2016); Christopher Coker, The Rise of the Civilizational State 
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them, Partlett and ip recognized the congruence of traditional Chinese bureaucratic 
and historical approach to law and Leninist principles of governance in relation to 
centralized governance by law.119
the discussion above can show sufficiently that Hong Kong and macau continue 
to play their roles in the national rejuvenation project of the Chinese nation, not 
separately, but in ways coordinated under the leadership of the CPC and implemented 
through its legal and non-legal nodes and connections with the Sars and their 
economies and communities. in this connection, the law, Leninist encoded, has 
served the interests of the CPC and the Central authorities under its leadership in 
the governing of Hong Kong.
the united States has cancelled the preferential treatment it once accorded to 
Hong Kong in distinction to that accorded to the PrC.120 any talk of the Sino-British 
Joint declaration 1984 providing international redress is hollow since the PrC, a party 
to the treaty and the sovereign of Hong Kong, made it known in 2017 that it regards 
the treaty as “spent.”121 Hong Kong residents’ perception of oCtS has plunged to all 
time low net rating of minus 40 percentage points.122 twenty-three years since the 
reunification with the motherland, the legal elite of Hong Kong cannot possibly rest 
on the reputational laurels of the common law and liberal constitutionalism, they 
have to face the realities of the “one Country” they live under, including the presence 
of the Central authorities’ view of legality.
References
Biddulph S. Democratic Centralism and Administration in China in Socialist Law in 
Socialist East Asia 195 (Hualing Fu et al. eds., 2018). https://doi.org/10.1017/978110 
8347822.008
Castellucci i. Legal Hybridity in Hong Kong and Macau, 57(4) mcGill L.J. 665 (2011).
Chan J.m.m. Behind the Text of the Basic Law: Some Constitutional Fundamentals in 
The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective 193 (rosalind dixon & adrienne 
Stone eds., 2018). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108277914.007
(2019); Gideon rachman, China, India and the Rise of the “Civilization State,” Financial times, 4 march 
2019 (mar. 5, 2021), available at www.ft.com/content/b6bc9ac2-3e5b-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44.
119  Partlett & ip 2016, at 475.
120  See the President’s executive order on Hong Kong normalization, executive order 13936, 14 July 
2020 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-
15646/the-presidents-executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization.
121  See Joyce ng, Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong ‘No Longer Has Any Realistic Meaning’, Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Says, South China morning Post, 30 June 2017 (mar. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2100779/sino-british-joint-declaration-hong-
kong-no-longer-has-any.
122  For the relevant surveys done by the Hong Kong Public opinion research institute on Hong Kong’s 
public confidence in oCtS (mar. 5, 2021), available at http://www.pori.hk/pop-poll/cross-strait-
relation/k006.
PUI-YIN LO 123
Chan J.m.m. Paths of Justice (2018).
Chen a.H.y. & Lo P.y. Hong Kong’s Judiciary Under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in 
Asia-Pacific Judiciaries: Independence, Impartiality and Integrity 131 (Hoong P. Lee & 
marilyn Pittard eds., 2018). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316480946.009
Chen a.H.y. An Introduction to the Chinese Legal System (5th ed., Lexisnexis, 2019).
Cheng J. The Way of Governance and the Power of Governance: A Systemic Analysis 
of China’s Constitution (2015).
Cheung K.y. & Fan C.S. Hong Kong Investment in China and Income Distribution of 
Hong Kong, 16(4) J. econ. integr. 526 (2001).
enright m.J. Developing China: The Remarkable Impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
(2017). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315393346
Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Johannes m.m. 
Chan et al. eds., 2000).
Hung H. Chinese State Capitalism in Hong Kong in Routledge Handbook of Contem-
porary Hong Kong 430 (tai-lok Lui et al. eds., 2019). https://doi.org/10.4324/978131 
5660530
Introduction to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Shu-
wen Wang ed., 2nd ed. 2009).
ip e.C. Interpreting Interpretations: A Methodology for the Judicial Enforcement of 
Legislative Interpretations of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 2017 Pub. L. 552 (2017).
Ku a. Identity as Politics: Contesting the Local, the National and the Global in 
Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong 451 (tai-lok Lui et al. eds., 2019). 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315660530
Lam J. Re-thinking the NPCSC’s Power to Interpret the Basic Law, 47 Hong Kong 
L.J. 825 (2017).
Lin F. The Duty of Hong Kong Courts to Follow the NPCSC’s Interpretation of the Basic 
Law: Are There Any Limits?, 48 Hong Kong L.J. 167 (2018).
Lo P.y. & Chen a.H.y. The Judicial Perspective of “Separation of Powers” in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 5(2) J. int’l Comp. 
L. 337 (2018).
Lo P.y. An Internationalist, Consequentialist and Non-progressive Court: Constitutional 
Adjudication in Hong Kong (1997–2009), 2 City u. H.K. L. rev. 215 (2010).
Lo P.y. Enforcing an Unfortunate, Unnecessary and ‘Unquestionably Binding’ NPCSC 
Interpretation: The Hong Kong Judiciary’s Deconstruction of its Construction of the Basic 
Law, 48 Hong Kong L.J. 399 (2018).
Lo P.y. Hong Kong: Common Law Courts in China in Asian Courts in Context 183 
(Jiunn-rong yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBo9781107 
588813.006
Lo P.y. The Judicial Construction of Hong Kong’s Basic Law (2014).
Lovell J. Maoism: A Global History (2019).
Partlett W. & ip e.C. Is Socialist Law Really Dead?, 48(2) n.y.u. J. int’l L. & Politics 
463 (2016).
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL     Volume IX (2021) Issue 2 124
Potter P. China’s Legal System (2013).
Qiao X. Studying the Basic Law, Upgrading the Quality of Civil Servants: A Speech at 
the Graduation Ceremony of the “Advanced Course of the Basic Law of MSAR,” 6 acad. J. 
of one Country, two Systems 1 (2010).
Sung y. Becoming Part of One National Economy: Maintaining Two Systems in the 
Midst of the Rise of China in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong 66 (tai-
lok Lui et al. eds., 2019). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315660530
Wang Z. Relationship Between the Chinese Central Authorities and Regional Govern-
ments of Hong Kong and Macao: A Legal Perspective (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
978-981-13-2322-5
Williams B. Lenin and the Problem of Nationalities, 15(4-6) Hist. eur. ideas 611 
(1992). https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(92)90070-S
Woodman S. Legislative Interpretation by China’s National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee: A Power with Roots in the Stalinist Conception of Law in Interpreting 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The Struggle for Coherence 229 (Hualing Fu et al. eds., 2007). 
https://doi.org/ 10.1057/9780230610361
Xiao W. On the Hong Kong Basic Law (2003).
yu y. The Memoirs of Yu Ying-Shih (2018).
Zhang Q. The Constitution of China: A Contextual Analysis (2012).
Zhang W. The China Horizon: Glory and Dream of a Civilizational State (2016).
Zhang W. The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State (2012).
Information about the author
Pui-yin Lo (Hong Kong, China) – Barrister, Part-time Lecturer, university of Hong 
Kong (rm. 1705, 17/F, marina House, 68 Hing man St., Shau Kei Wan, Hong Kong; 
e-mail: pylo@lopyhk.page).
